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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH by and through 
its Treasurer, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SPRING CITY, an municipal corporation, 
and HYRUM JENSEN, its Mayor~ 
CLAUD ACORD, R 0 Y A L ALLRED, 
.. CUTLER SCHOFIELD, HENRY SCHO-
FIELD and VIRGUS OSBORNE, its Coun-
c i 1m en, and CHARLES THOMPSON, 
ROYAL ALLRED, VIRGUS OSBORNE, 
MAX BLAIN, LOWELL HANSEN, AL-
LEN BECK and HENRY BLAIN, 
Defendants and Respondents. , 
CIVIL 
No. 7942 
BRIEF OF SPRING CITY RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT O·F PO·INTS 
POINT 1 
THE BO·NDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, ISSUED 
BY THE DEFENDANT SPRING CITY, ARE UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AND VOID BECAUSE THE DEBT LIMIT IMPOS-
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ED BY ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH, WAS EXCEEDED. 
POINT II 
IF THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, BE 
VOID IN AN ABSENCE OF AN ELECTION AUTHORIZ-
ING THE ISSUE, PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RE-




THE l30NDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, ISSUED 
BY THE DEFENDANT SPRING CITY, ARE UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL AND VOID BECAUSE THE DEBT LIMIT IM-
POSED BY ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH, WAS EXCEEDED. 
The Appellant, the State of Utah, has in its brief, set 
out the facts, pleadings, proceedings and evidence in an able 
and satisfactory manner. The Respondent, Spring City, will 
address itself to the problem whether or not Section 3, Article 
14, of the Constitution of the State of Utah has been violated, 
and if the said violation makes the bonds issued by Spring 
City and purchased by the State of Utah void. Section 3 of 
Article 14, is set out as follows: 
No debt in excess of the taxes for the current year 
shall be created by any county or subdivision thereof, 
or by any school district therein, or by any city, 
town, or village, or any subdivision thereof in this 
State; unless the proposition to create such debt, 
shall have been submitted to a vote of such qualified 
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electors as shall have paid a property tax therein, 
in the year preceeding such election, and a majority 
of those voting thereon shall have voted in favor of 
incurring such debt. 
The Respondent, Spring City, agrees with the Findings 
of Fact of the Court and is willing to rely upon them 
in determining the law question involved. 
There are two constitutional limits of indebtedness, 
one which the city can incur without a bond election, which 
bonds must be paid for from the revenues of the current 
year in which issued, and another limitation on the amount 
the city can become indebted if the indebtedness is author-
ized by a bond election. 
It is very clear that the purpose of Section 3 and 
Section 4 of Article 14, is to serve as a limit to taxation and 
as a protection to taxpayers. (Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 U. 
321, 340. 279 P. 878.). At the time the Constitution was 
framed, the history of the COWl try and of the people in 
this territory afforded examples of municipal corporations 
which had become bankrupt through the reckless and ex-
travagent management of their governing bodies. The fra-
mers of the Constitution had undoubtedly considered the evils 
which resulted to both the taxpayers and the creditors of 
municipal corporations from the unlimited power in creation 
of debts. They must have agreed that the policy to follow 
was that the municipalities must pay as they go, and that 
they should go only so far as they can pay. 
In a Utah case entitled Fritsch v. Board of Com'rs. 
of Salt Lake County et al, 15 U. 83, 47 P. 1026, this Court 
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construed Section 3, of Article 14, and stated in effect that 
no debt shall be created by any county during the year, 
without a vote of the taxpayers, which the revenues of 
the year will not pay. The Court also said: 
"2. The language of Section 3, Art. 14, Const., that 
'no debt, in excess of the taxes of the current year, 
shall be created,' cannot be held to mean that the 
county may expend the entire revenue of the year, 
and in addition thereto create indebtedness equal to 
the tax levy of the year. A debt cannot be incurred 
_in one year, floated over into the next, and paid out 
of its revenues, without. a vote. The indebtedness of 
the year must be paid out of its revenues. 
"4. The language of the constitutional provision, 'no 
debts in excess of the taxes for the current year shall 
be created' (Article 14, Sec. 3) means all debts which 
cannot be paid out of the revenues of the year. In 
determining when the limit is reached, liabilities im-
posed by . the law should be taken into consideration, 
as well as by those created by contract. 
"8. County warrants or county bonds issued without 
authority of law are not valid in the hands of persons 
receiving them, or to whom they may have been as-
signed. Such persons in a legal sense, cannot be in-
nocent holders." 
It is the respondent's (Spring City) position that the 
case in issue is the situation that the framers of our Consti-
tution sought to prevent, by enacting into law Section 3. That 
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it is the situation the Court had in mind when it ruled in 
Fritsch v. Board of Comr's. 
Spring City has now in force several bond issues where 
the council authorizing same ignored Section 3, Article 14, 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and borrowed money 
without the consent of the taxpayers, used it, and in the 
bonds evidencing the obligation, stated that a future admin-
istration would pay the obligation. The time finally came 
when the future administration did not have the funds to 
pay on the bonds, and had no way in which to get the 
money to pay off the indebtedness. 
There is no question but that Spring City received 
the money under this bond proceeding. However, no way 
was provided for in the original bond proceedings for the 
money to be raised or taxed, and there being no way 
under the laws of the State of Utah to tax the people to 
pay it back, repayment became impossible. If Section 3, 
Article 14, of the Constitution of the State of Utah had 
been followed as construed by this Court in Fritsch v. 
Board of Comr's., the situation that Spring City is now in 
would never have occured. 
The appellant, by its argument would have the Court 
affirm this bond proceeding and this type of financing, 
basing its argument upon the Courts decision in the case 
of Muir vs. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433. In 
that case the Court held in essence that the time of pay-
ment, even though in successive years, would not void an 
obligation under Section 3, Article 14, of our Constitution. 
It is our opinion that the court was correct in its ruling 
in that case, but that it, in no way, reverses the rules laid 
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down in the Fritsch case. In the Muir case there was no 
evidence to show that the moneys that could be reached 
were not from the revenues of the year in which th obli-
gation was created, and also in the Muir case, there were 
moneys that could be reached. It is the opinion of the re-
spondent that because of misconstrueing the Muir case, 
bonds similar to the one in -issue have been placed on the 
market, and such a practice is directly responsible for the 
financial break-down of Spring City. 
It must be kept in mind that when this present Spring 
City obligation was created, there was no method provided 
in the bonds or the ordinance creating same for the repay-
ment of principal and interest, and that on the face it was 
stated that payment was to be made in 1961 and there-
after, a time more than 10 years in the future. The propo-
sition to create the indebtedness was never submitted to a 
vote of the taxpayers. At the present time, Spring City 
is taxing its citizens the maximum allowed under the law 
for the payment of indebtedness. All of the revenues from 
the power plant and- water works are pledged to the pay-
ment of other obligations, which are in effect mortgages 
on the respective systems. That because of several obli-
gations created in a like manner as the obligation in issue 
the city was and is in such a financial condition that to continue 
to operate, it became necessary to adopt a pay as you go 
policy, and to refuse payment on this illegal bond issue. 
The appellant argues that the obligation was valid 
when it was created in that it was dated January 15, 1948, 
and as of that date the sum of $13,498.67 was within the 
unexpended revenues for the year 1 9 4 8. The appel-
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lant refuses to take into consideration the necessary oper-
ating expenses of t h e City that were spent during the 
year 1948. Fritsch vs. Board of Com'rs. of Salt Lake County 
clearly holds that in determining the debt limit, the liabil-
ities imposed by the law and by contract should be taken 
into consideration. It necessarily follows that the operating 
expense of the City should be allowed. There is no evi-
dence before the court that the expenditures of Spring City 
in 1948, other than the funds received under the bond 
issue, 'vere not the regular operating expenses, and the 
Court held that there are no funds from 1948 that are 
not now expended. 
Financing municipalities based upon borrowing pro-
cedures, that the appellant, by inference, proposes in his 
brief, runs contrary to common sense. Pyramiding indebt-
edness for a future generation to pay, without providing a 
means of payment, is certainly not what was meant by 
Section 3, Article 14, Constitution of the State of Utah. It 
is therefore our position that in determining the debt limit 
the probable expenditures and operating expenses for the 
year must be taken into consideration. Fritsch vs. Board 
of Com'rs .... 
The appellant, by refusing to recognize the expenses 
of the respondent during the year 1948, is able to assume 
that the Bonds here in issue are valid. It is then an easy 
matter to cite cases holding that the bonds should be paid 
by the City, especially where the City has funds or the 
ability to tax. Spring City is in neither of these situations. 
Appellant also argues that to hold this bond issue 
void would be, in ·effect, placing in jeopardy what we call 
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the "tax anticipation" bond. This is not so. The "tax anti-
cipation" bond is payable solely out of the revenues of the 
year for which it is borrowed, and, as such, is collectable 
only out of· those respective revenues. The bond in issue 
is borrowing money to be paid by future generations, and 
there is no way that the said obligations are to be paid 
without a bond election. 
Appellant argues that because the bond proceedings 
stated that this was a required expenditure it wasn't to be 
a debt within the meaning of the Constitution. In McNeil 
vs. Waco, 89 Tex 83, 33 S.W. 322 .. See 90 A.L.R. 1240 
... , The court said: 
"We conclude that the word 'debt' as used in the 
constitutional provisions above quoted, means any 
pecuniary obligation imposed by contract, except 
such as \vere, at the date of the contract within the 
lawful contemplation of the parties, to be satisfied 
out of the current revenues for the year, or out oi 
some fund within the immediate control of the cor-
poration..... Prima facie, every pecuniary obliga-
tion attempted to be created by contract is a debt, 
within the meaning of the constitutional provisions 
above; and a party attempting to recover against 
the city thereon must allege the facts showing a com-
pliance with the Constitution and statutes necessary 
to bind the city, or must allege such facts as to bring 
the particular claim within the exception above sta-
ted in the definition of the word 'debt'. If it should 
appear from the pleadings or the face of the obli-
10 
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gation, that the subject .. of the contract was clearly 
a matter of ordinary expenditure, such as repairing 
streets or salary of an officer, this would be sufficient 
to bring it within the exception, for the prima facie 
presumption would be that such claim was intended 
to be paid out of the current revenues annually 
collected for the payment of such claims, and it would 
not be presumed the city has attempted to make con-
tracts in excess of its. revenues for the year; but 
where as in the case at bar, the subject of the contract 
is not one which the court can say, as a matter of law, 
is an item of ordinary expenditure, the petition, in 
order to bring it within the exception, must allege 
some additional fact, such as that there was, at the 
date of contract, a fund in the treasury, legally appli-
cable thereto, out of which the parties contemplated 
that such claim should be paid." 
This A.L.R. citation deals with failure to comply with 
statutory requirements that a municipality at or before in-
curring indebtedness provide for a tax for its payment as 
affecting validity of indebtedness or obligations issued there-
fore. In Wilson vs. Shreveport, 29 La. Ann. 673, it was 
held that under this type of statute, bonds issued without 
levying a tax to provide for their extinguishment were a b-
solute nullities, unforceable even in the hands of a trans-
feree in good faith for valuable consideration, before ma-
turity. The court said: 
"Those who contract with municipal corporations knov1 
that these bodies act validly only 'vithin the powers 
11 
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conferred upon them by the special laws by which 
they are created; and the creditor of a corporation 
is bound to see that the contract or obligation of 
which he claims the benefit is within the power which 
the corporation may lawfully exercise. The fact that 
the obligation is in the shape of negotiable instrument, 
or that it was acquired in good faith, for a vaulable 
consideration, before maturity, in no manner enlarges 
the power of the corporation, or gives any additional 
force or validity to its unauthorized acts." 
We submit that the obligation was invalid when it 
was created, that the only argument for validity comes from 
misconstruction of the case of Muir vs. Murray City. Re-
spondent calls the courts's attention to the Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933, Annotated, Title 15, Chapter 8, Section 6, 
Borrowing Power of Cities, where in the note to said section 
it is stated as follows: 
Const. Art. 14, Sec. 3, prohibits a city from creating 
an indebtedness in excess of its revenues for the cur-
rent year, unless the proposition is submitted to a 
vote and approved by the electors. But the inhibition 
only goes to the question of excess amount, not to 
the time of the payment. If the amount of indebted-
ness is limited to revenue for the current year, pay-
ment may be provided for after the year expires. If 
a city has no power to incur an indebtedness, it is not 
only justified but it is its duty to set up the defense 
of ultra vires. Taxes do not become due for a number 
of months after the fiscal year for cities commences 
12 
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(15-8-86) and a city may borrow in anticipation of 
its revenues for corporate purposes. Muir vs. Murray 
City, 186 P. 433, 55 U. 368. Dickinson vs. Salt Lake 
City, 195 P. 1110, 57 U.530." 
POINT II 
IF THE BONDS, SERIES O·F JANUARY 15, 1948, 
SHOULD BE VOID IN AN ABSENCE OF AN ELE.CTION 
AUTHORIZING THE ISSUE, PLAINTIFF IS NOT EN-
TITLED TO RECOVER UPON THE THEORY OF MONEY 
HAD AND RECEIVED. 
The appellant argues that ·if the bond issue is void 
because there was no bond election, then he is entitled to 
recover upon the theory of money had and received. 
If the object of Section 3 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah is the protection of the taxpayers, to prevent 
taxing the people without their consent, and to keep munici-
palities on a pay as you go principle, how can the constitu-
tional inhibition be made effectual if the purchaser of the 
forbidden claim can come in the form of a suitor for money 
had and received rather than in the action of indebitatus as-
sumsit? Is it the cause of action, rather than the form of ac-
tion, which determines the right? In either case, the munici-
pality and the people residing therein would be required to pay 
the judgment. Such distinction would sacrifice substance to 
form, and its practical result inevitably would be a null-
ification of the Constitution. What the law forbids muni-
cipal bodies to do directly should not be permitted by in-
direct methods. Morton vs. Nevada. 41 Fed. 582. 
It is the opinion of the respondent that Fritsch vs. 
13 
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Board of Com'rs. also negatives such a view for setting at 
naught the provisions of the Constitution. The error of 
following such a view could only be based upon want of 
attention to the object and purpose of the constitutional re-
striction in question. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent, Spring City, submits the decision of 
the Court, as based upon its Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of the Law. There being only one question to decide; 
was section 3 of Article 14, of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah violated by the bond proceedings in issue? To hold 
that it wasn't violated, would be to set up a precedent for 
poor financing and to encourage other municipalities to make 
the same mistake that Spring City made. I£ the Court, how-
ever, rules that the bond issue is valid, the respondent re-
spectfully requests the Court to tell us how to pay it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON V. TIBBS 
Attorney for Respondent Spring 
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